报告题目：Evolutionary Games on Networks

报告时间：2023-09-28   10:00-12:00

报告人：苏奇  副教授  上海交通大学

报告地点：理学院东北楼四楼报告厅（404）

Abstract: Collective intelligence, which emphasizes that systems can rely on cooperation and coordination among individuals to achieve goals that are impossible by any individual alone to achieve, proves to be an increasingly promising research direction in artificial intelligence. In collective intelligence, one of the most cutting-edge questions is how and when cooperation and coordination emerge, especially when individuals have the cognitive ability to make their own behavioral decisions and simultaneously face conflicts between their own and collective interests. Classic game theory based on the assumption of perfect rationality has predicted a convergence towards the Nash Equilibrium state, i.e., the collapse of cooperation.

In this talk, I give a brief overview of studies about system structures’ effects on the evolution of cooperation. Besides, I present three works about the evolutionary games on complex networks, which respectively accounts for the coupling of multiple systems, the direction of interactions, and the time varying features of system structures. We derive rigorous analytical conditions to predict when a system evolves away from the Nash Equilibrium and reveal that the coupling of multiple systems, unidirectional interactions, and dynamic networks can promote the evolution of cooperation by orders of magnitude.